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 The 2001 invasion, occupation and subsequent anti-Taliban war have created a 
strong pressure to ethnocratic rule in Afghanistan. The logic of alliance-building and 
counterinsurgency after the invasion forced a heavy reliance on ethnically defi ned 
militia groups. Yet, ethnocracy, defi ned as rule by the dominant ethnic group, albeit 
in alliance with subordinates, does not align well with Afghan political traditions. 
The identity of the Afghan state has historically centred on an interaction among 
regional or tribal solidarity, nationalism and Islam, rather than ethnicity per se. This 
essay discusses the interaction among these forms of solidarity in Afghan history. It 
offers a brief history of ethno-national politics in the country and discusses other 
forms of socio-political solidarity centred on clientelism and kinship networks. 
It outlines the ethnicisation of elite politics during the occupation, as the mili-
tary alliance introduced an informal model of inter-ethnic power-sharing into the 
workings of the Afghan state. In its fi nal sections, the essay assesses post-occupation 
political dynamics beyond ethnicisation. It argues that pressure for inter-ethnic bar-
gaining and for non-ethnic political contention appears to be strengthening in the 
context of a would-be pluralist state, as defi ned by the 2004 Afghan Constitution, 
and with the formal end of US occupation. The essay ends by assessing possibilities 
for ethno-political de-alignment, for enabling political contention within a broadly 
nationalist and Islamic political fi eld, enabling a sustained de-escalation in political 
violence. 
 Afghanistan and empire 
 Whilst never colonised, Afghanistan is an artefact of imperial rivalry. This is a critical 
factor in understanding its prospects. In the fi rst instance, imperial power defi ned its 
territory. With the British failure to incorporate Afghanistan by invasion, the east-
ern border of Afghanistan defi ned the limit of the British Empire in the nineteenth 
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century. British efforts focused on delimiting the state through territorial acquisi-
tion. The eventual loss of eastern territory from Afghanistan to British India was 
defi ned in a one-page document in 1893 that established the “Durand line” (Biswas 
2013). Nineteenth-century British-Russian rivalry was mirrored in the 1970s and 
1980s with the Pakistan-US alliance against the Soviet-backed Afghan government. 
A Soviet military guarantee for the Afghan government in 1978 enabled the US 
to lure the Soviets “into the Afghan trap”, to “give the USSR its Vietnam war”, as 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security advisor, put it (Gibbs 
2000). The effect of this was to create a decade-long civil war in which the US 
armed and funded warlords and Islamists (which later rebounded on the US with 
the formation of Al Qaeda) would come to dominate. The assumption that foreign 
policy manipulations could only have consequences for the people living in those 
contexts was rudely shattered. The ensuing war on terror very clearly demonstrated 
the extent to which the US and its allies were threatened by Al Qaeda insurgency 
(Goodman 2013). The UN-sanctioned goal of rooting out governments hosting Al 
Qaeda or groups deemed to be its associates was interpreted by the US as a green 
light to invade Taliban-held Afghanistan and led to a more than decade-long US 
occupation of the country (Williamson 2001). This brought the US and its allies 
into new state-building roles in Afghanistan, and the country has remained highly 
internationalised. 
 Again, the future of Afghanistan sits at the centre of a global empire – its 
future circumscribed by external forces. Not least among these is Pakistan, 
which was rehabilitated as a US partner in the war on the Taliban; concerns 
about military dictatorship and nuclear proliferation were set aside, and even 
ongoing collaboration between elements of the Pakistani state and the Taliban 
was overlooked. In the process, a neighbouring country that has a strong inter-
est in a weakened Afghan state has gained an important role in infl uencing the 
future of the country (Fair and Gregory 2013; Maley 2016). Pakistan, in fact, 
may exercise a veto power on state stability in Afghanistan. Since 2005, these 
issues have been brought into sharp focus with the growing power of the Tali-
ban, which has repositioned itself as a national liberation movement at war with 
the occupying forces and their appointees (Kamel 2015). Refl ecting this, the 
Afghan government opened negotiations with the Taliban for the transition to 
US withdrawal in 2014. A key element of this was the recognition of  de facto
Taliban control over large segments of the country. The Taliban continues to 
strengthen its hand by alternating between political violence and negotiations, 
and this has persisted since the 2014 US withdrawal, partly driven by external 
interests (Maley 2016). 
 A brief ethno-political history 
 Modern Afghanistan emerged under the Persian Empire in the mid-eighteenth 
century, with Kabul as its capital since 1775. Internal confl ict among the ruling 
tribal elites culminated in the rise of Dost Muhammad Khan, a tribal leader, who 
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gained control as Amir (prince) in 1826. Dost Muhammad’s descendants then 
ruled the country for the next 150 years (Axworthy 2009; Barfi eld 2010). During 
the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became a competing ground for geopolitical 
infl uence between the British and Russian empires (Fremont-Barnes 2014). Rus-
sia invaded large parts of Central Asia, including the northern parts of Afghani-
stan, seeking access to the Indian Ocean (Tripodi 2010). Trying to insulate colonial 
India, British troops invaded Afghanistan in 1839 and were defeated, withdraw-
ing in 1842. With Russian advances into Central Asia, the Afghan Amir signed a 
friendship treaty with the Russians, precipitating a second British invasion in 1878. 
Afghanistan became a protectorate of the British Empire in 1880 under a treaty 
assigning control of the country’s external relations to the British, and later, in 1893, 
the Amir recognised the “Durand Line” which consigned half of the country’s ter-
ritory, and half of its Pashtun population, to British India, rendering Afghanistan 
landlocked (Balachandar 2012). 
 In the early twentieth century, Afghanistan embarked on its own national devel-
opment program. In 1919, the Amir precipitated the third Anglo-Afghan War, which 
ended Afghanistan’s protectorate status, allowing the country to become fully inde-
pendent. The constitution was drawn up in 1923, based on the French model, and 
the Amir (now King Amanullah Khan), sought to westernise the country, includ-
ing the adoption of a European dress code. The Islamic authorities opposed the 
new dispensation and in 1929 overthrew the king with the help of the army (and 
supported by the British) (Hiro 1995). Within that year, a new king was installed, 
Nadir Shah, and the country was renamed the Islamic state of Afghanistan. The 
king was assassinated in 1933 and his son, Zahir Shah, ruled until 1973. In these 
40 years of political stability (1933–1973), Afghanistan experienced some degree of 
modernisation, emerging as a constitutional monarchy under its 1964 Constitution, 
although the country remained one of the world’s least developed. Geopolitically, 
during World War II, Afghanistan was neutral, and in the Cold War it was closely 
aligned with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the United States developed close 
military ties with Pakistan. 
 In 1973, a former prime minister, Daoud Khan, staged a successful coup against 
Zahir Shah, installing a republican administration while the king was in Italy 
(remarkably, the king was to return to the country to legitimise the transition of 
power after the US invasion in 2002 and died in 2007). Daoud Khan was then 
himself ousted in 1978 in a military coup led by the Marxist-Leninist People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (Rubin 1995; Dimitrakis 2013). Divisions 
in the PDPA started to emerge, and fearing the collapse of the regime, the Soviet 
Union signed a treaty of friendship with the government in 1978, guaranteeing 
military assistance in the event of a threat to the country’s territorial integrity 
(Krivosheev 1997). The regime became further factionalised and was threatened by 
hostile forces internally and on the Pakistani border (Khan 2011). The Soviet state 
bolstered the regime, and at the end of 1979, several thousand troops were sent as 
direct military “assistance” and a new, more pro-Soviet president, Babrak Karmal, 
was installed (Hassan 1995). 
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 The Soviet-backed regime sought to align socialism with Islamic social justice, 
using Russian fi nancial aid. However, the presence of more than 120,000 Russian 
troops in Afghanistan infl amed nationalistic sentiments, and forceful resistance was 
unifi ed into the Afghan Mujahideen (Holy Warriors), backed by the Pakistan state. 
The ensuing nationalist war displaced more than six million Afghans into sur-
rounding countries. From 1985, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets encouraged 
power sharing with the Mujahideen and in 1986 installed Muhammad Najibullah 
as PDPA president to negotiate a truce and enable Soviet forces to withdraw, which 
they did in 1989 (Kaplan 2001). The constitution was revised in 1990 to remove 
references to communism, re-founding Afghanistan as a “unitary and Islamic state”, 
and Najibullah remained in power until 1992 when Russian aid ceased. His exe-
cution in 1996, after four years of civil war, announced the arrival of the Tali-
ban regime. During this period, ethnic violence became increasingly prevalent in 
a transition from ideological politics to identity politics linked to militarisation 
(Sharma 2017). Militarised ethnic blocs, headed by warlord elites, came to domi-
nate the political landscape during the Taliban period, and after. 
 The meaning of ethnicity in Afghanistan 
 Historically, the Afghan polity has oscillated across combinations of nationalism and 
Islam, with institutions variously centred on monarchical, democratic and theo-
cratic power. Political violence has, though, become more linked to ethnicity since 
the Soviet withdrawal. The concept of ethnicity in Dari, the dominant Afghan 
language, is most closely expressed in the term  Qawm , which refers to a group of 
people who have a common ancestry, common language and culture, and a shared 
history and heritage. However, in Afghanistan, more markedly than in many other 
places, the meaning of ethnicity is blurred and shaped by other forms of identi-
fi cation. As Schetter observes, through the nineteenth century, “identities [were] 
derived from tribal origin, religious or sectarian belonging, social status and profes-
sion”, noting these “societal boundaries and group formation altered in place and 
time” (Schetter 2005a, 5). Despite strong cross-border ethnic links, for instance for 
Pashtuns into Pakistan, for Tajiks in Tajikistan and Uzbeks with Uzbekistan, there 
has been no serious movement for secession or irredentism in Afghanistan (unlike 
in other postcolonial contexts) (Adeney 2008). Regional powers have intervened 
to support ethnicised proxies, Pakistan for Pashtuns, Iran for Hazarras and Tajiks, 
but this has not translated into an irredentist political project. Afghan nationalism, 
in this respect, is dominant. 
 Civil confl icts, including state violence and nationalist insurgencies, have been 
the main source of political violence, not ethnic confl ict. These confl icts have hol-
lowed out national elites: the Soviet invasion in 1979, with the subsequent civil war 
and eventual installation of the Taliban in 1996, saw an exodus especially of urban 
middle classes into neighbouring refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan; four million 
people returned after the 2001 invasion, but, as noted, under occupation the coun-
try’s elites failed to generate economic autonomy and instead became increasingly 
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orientated to international aid fl ows. As the security situation deteriorated from 
2005, the exodus began again, increasing numbers to three million in Pakistan alone 
(which announced mass forced repatriation in 2016; Admadi and Lakhani 2016). 
During these periods of confl ict, everyday structures of kinship and clientelism had 
been central: “informal social security systems have been of critical importance in 
Afghanistan” (Schütte 2009, 479). Family and kinship is the major means of support 
in times of crisis and offers a foundational form of identity, linked with regional and 
tribal affi liations. In a country where civil society and the state are weak, kinship 
governs the individual’s life and activities (Wimmer and Schetter 2003). In Afghani-
stan, when people refer to their family, they generally mean their extended family, 
often across a kin-based network with several hundred members, linked through 
strong social and economic bonds (Tapper 1991). Kinship links with wider clien-
telist structures. These have their origins in the originally feudal system of  Arbab 
wa Rayat (client and patron). In this system, family or tribal leaders, landholders or 
employers, provide protection for the individuals that depend on them. Such pro-
tection creates an obligation for the Rayat or client, who must show their absolute 
loyalty to the  Arbab (patron) when required. There are also more informal structures 
of community duty for the well-off. In most neighbourhoods, there are individuals 
who support their locality, as part of their religious observance. Under the name of 
Khairat or baraie Khada (charity in the name of God, or because of God), respected 
and wealthy members of a locality devote an amount of their daily income to the 
poorer members of their neighbourhood. 
 With the breakdown of state authority and civil confl ict since 1979, dependence 
on these systems of mutual obligation has spread, so that many Afghans are now 
somehow connected by a powerful patron. Sharan argues these relations “charac-
terise the daily politics of contemporary Afghanistan . . . in which selective benefi ts 
are distributed to individuals or groups in exchange for loyalty or political support”; 
they then “link factional elites and their regional-ethnic or tribal clients to the 
state” (Sharan 2011, 1119). He characterises the post-invasion political settlement 
as centring on the accommodation and legitimation of ethno-regional elites, pro-
ducing a heightened ethnicisation of politics. In the context of on-going military 
confl ict, kinship, clan membership, tribal relations, religious obligation, local codes 
of honour and customary means of confl ict resolution have become more impor-
tant. As Schetter argues, “[t]he permanent conditions of war since 1979 did not 
impair the signifi cance of family, but the increased insecurity strengthened the role 
of kinship and clientelism. Distrust grew to such an extent that clientelism spread 
to almost every sphere of the Afghan society” (2005a , 10). In the cities, informal 
sources of social obligation have been weaker, especially amongst those internally 
displaced by confl ict, leaving “a deep sense of insecurity for the urban poor”, and 
approximately 80 per cent of the urban population relying on informal sources of 
livelihood and shelter (Schütte 2009, 479). Informal clientelism as a social practice 
is distinct from state corruption, which is extensive and has deeply corrosive effects 
(Braithwaite and Wardak 2013). Rangelov and Theros found that the “system of 
governance gives rise to an acute sense of injustice among ordinary Afghans, as they 
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witness the contrast between their own deprivation and daily struggle for survival, 
and the growing wealth of a privileged group of offi cials and power brokers” (Ran-
gelov and Theros 2012, 236). State security is contracted to foreign security com-
panies, which employ local sub-contractors, often former Mujahideen commanders 
and warlords, who have the power to enforce bribery. Funds are routinely exported: 
in 2011, US$ 4.6 billion of declared funds left Afghanistan via Kabul airport, an 
amount equivalent to the country’s entire state budget for that year (Rangelov and 
Theros 2012; Shahrani 2015). 
 Another consequence of the decades-long internal confl ict is the emergence of 
strong informal justice systems. This “legal pluralism” refl ects the lack of trust in an 
often-corrupted state, or simply the absence of state authority (Wimpelmann 2013). 
The rule of law established post-2001 has been set up in combination with tribal 
and Islamic sources of legal authority. More or less institutionalised, informal jus-
tice varies across regions and population groups. Afghan Pashtuns, for instance, live 
under three regimes – Afghan law, the tribal rule of Pashtun Wali and the Islamic 
Sharia – with community judges arguing all three are compatible. Often considered 
the ideal type of informal justice is the image of the  Jirga .  Jirga is a Pashto word for 
a purpose-specifi c gathering of entrusted men tasked to make a decision or resolve 
a dispute. Through discussion, the representatives agree upon a settlement to restore 
honour, to which the parties are expected to adhere; women rarely participate and 
may themselves become part of the compensation package, a practice called  baad . 
Since 2001, various efforts at reforming and formalising these “hybrid” arrange-
ments have not been successful, forcing a continued pragmatic use of informal 
structures in the context of the on-going Taliban insurgency (Wimpelmann 2013). 
 Occupation, warlordism and ethnocracy 
 When global and regional powers intervene in Afghanistan, they have invariably 
assumed the existence of ethnic division. One example is Tomsen’s account of US 
diplomacy in the region, which highlights great power manipulations in the coun-
try; in doing so, it exposes assumptions about ethnic rivalry, especially in the imme-
diate post-communist civil war (Tomsen 2011). Intervention, whether to favour 
one ethnic group over another, or to ‘manage’ inter-ethnic relations, pre-empts 
the possibility of other foundations for political solidarity, be they tribal, religious, 
regional or national. External observers often assume that ethnic groups have a 
clear and distinct identity and read local confl icts as ethnic disputes. One journalist 
recently replicated the recurrent claim about Afghans, that “historically when they 
haven’t been united fi ghting outsiders, they’ve been fi ghting each other” (Campbell 
2013). Certainly, political institutions are dominated by Pashtuns. Under the British 
Empire, Pashtun elites were favoured as a bulwark against Russian infl uence: “Pash-
tuns were privileged in all areas and dominated the military; Tajiks were left with 
the economic sector and the educational institutions, whereas the Hazaras were 
marginalised in general” (Schetter 2005a, 7). Political power since the eighteenth 
century has almost exclusively been held by Pashtuns, and the creation of a Pashtun 
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state extending into Pakistan has been pursued by the leadership, for instance, under 
Prime Minister Sardar Muhammad Daoud Khan, in the years between 1953 and 
1963. Refl ecting these legacies, political confl ict is often attributed to Pashtun 
domination and assumes primordial ethnic identifi cation. Such accounts then drive 
policy, especially in relation to state-building efforts by the Soviet Union after 1979, 
and later under the US from 2001. 
 Consecutive Soviet-aligned governments in Kabul had warned people of for-
eigners’ plans to divide the country on ethnic lines. There was some degree of truth 
in this as both Iran and Pakistan had an interest in ethnicising the war and funded 
ethnic proxies to achieve this (Pstrusinska 1990). Iran supported mainly Hazaras, 
based on their religious connection, and the Tajiks because of their language and 
cultural connection; Pakistan supported Pashtun groups because of their shared 
Pashtun heritage. Warlords themselves, seeing no other basis for their legitimacy, 
would assert ethnic leadership to convince foreign donors they had a broad constit-
uency within Afghanistan. The Soviet Union labelled the rebel groups as the agents 
of foreign countries aiming to divide Afghanistan on ethnic lines. Once again, there 
was some truth in this as many of the so-called Mujahideen were in close asso-
ciation with foreign funders. With the Soviet invasion, fear of ethnic confl ict was 
commonplace: the regime attempted to de-ethnicise the state, but Pashtun elites 
persisted (Roy 1986). The collapse of the PDPA regime from 1992 led to civil war, 
but it was not a war among ethnic groups, rather between rival warlords and their 
respective militias (Giustozzi 2012). During the civil war, thousands of people lost 
their lives, but ethnic groups kept relative peace with one another. The main ethnic 
victim of the civil war was the Hazara Shia minority, although anti-Hazara attacks 
also refl ected religious sectarianism. Post-1996, the Taliban regime was Pashtun-led 
and systematically repressed Shia Muslims and in particular the Hazaras in a number 
of cities in Afghanistan, on a sectarian basis. With the collapse of the Taliban govern-
ment and the US war in Afghanistan in October 2001, there was once again specu-
lation over the possibility of ethnic war. Yet, since 2001, there has been relatively 
little in the way of ethnic confl ict, especially given the scale of dislocation and con-
fl ict in the country. Ethnic displacement that had occurred in northern Afghanistan 
under the Taliban, in favour of Pashtuns, was reversed, with the expulsion of an 
estimated 20,000 Pashtuns from 2001 (Schetter 2005b). Another exception con-
cerns a number of clashes between the nomadic Pashtun tribes and Hazaras around 
Bamyan, refl ecting intensifi ed competition between the groups for access to water 
and land, and a range of sectarian anti-Hazara attacks, including by Taliban militants 
on Hazara refugees in Pakistan. The relative absence of ethnic confl ict post-2001 
contrasts with the ethnicisation of state power. Following the US invasion, the new 
architects of the state sought to unify the polity and publicly downplayed ethnic 
division. The international community, the United Nations and supporting NGOs 
sought to ensure that all ethnic groups would have a role in the political and social 
life of the country (Wafayezade 2015, 15). In practice, though, state power was used 
to translate the power of contending militias into modes of ethnic leverage: power 
blocs were de-militarised, but also ethnicised. As Schetter argues, “every Afghan was 
15040-3069d-1pass-r01.indd   183 9/16/2019   10:43:40 PM
184 Wahid Razi and James Goodman
assigned to a certain ethnic affi liation: the ‘Uzbek Dostum’, the ‘Pashtun Karzai’, 
the ‘Tajik Rabbani’ or the ‘Pashtun Zahir Shah’ ” (Schetter 2005a, 10). 
 UNSC Resolution 1378, adopted on November 14, 2001, had defi ned the 
framework for the post-Taliban administration, giving “strong support” for a gov-
ernment that was “broad- based, multi-ethnic and fully representative of all the 
Afghan people” (UN 2001). Afghan allies of the US met at the International Con-
ference on Afghanistan in Bonn on December 5, 2001, selecting Hamid Karzai to 
head the Afghan Interim Authority. The conference drew up an “Agreement on 
Provisional Arrangements” which stated the interim administration had to have 
“due regard to the ethnic, geographic and religious composition of Afghanistan”. 
Refl ecting this, Karzai’s cabinet was informally a form of power-sharing, composed 
of eleven Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, fi ve Hazaras, three Uzbeks and two members of 
other ethnic groups. Once installed in government as legitimate rulers, these ethno-
military leaders then positioned themselves as ethnic representatives, with a call 
on government posts (Mukhopadhyay 2014). As outlined by Ali, the breakdown 
was as follows: “Ahmad Shah Massoud’s and Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Northern 
Alliance became today’s Jamiat-e- Islami, a primarily Tajik organisation. Uzbeks 
organised under Rashid Dostum’s Junbesh-e-Milli. Abdul Ali Mazari’s followers 
were now under the Hazara Hezb-e-Wahdat. And Pashtuns followed Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami. . . . The Mujahidin, the resistance who fought against 
the communist government, was fractioned into groups aligned to ethnicity as well. 
For instance, mainly Tajiks followed Ahmad Shah Massoud, Hazaras were led by 
Abdul Ali Mazari, Uzbeks and Turkmens were behind Abdul Rashid Dostum, and 
Pashtuns were with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar” (Ali 2015, 10). There was no necessary 
public support for these political blocs: many Afghans actively opposed the leader-
ship of these organisations. For example, in 2003, Hezb-i-Islami was banned as a 
terrorist organisation by the UN, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, dubbed the “butcher 
of Kabul” for his actions during the civil war, was barred from entry into Afghani-
stan. His accord with the Afghan government in 2016 led to his attempted rehabili-
tation, but there is little evidence of public support for him, amongst Pashtuns or 
non-Pashtuns (Rasmussen 2016). 
 Islam, Afghan nationalism and the constitution 
 The 2001 Bonn meeting, which defi ned the framework for the post-invasion pol-
ity, was heavily infl uenced by would-be ethnic leaders who (ironically) stressed 
the need to prevent ethnic confl ict in the country. A prominent role in all peace 
negotiations was granted to these leaders, who then built an ethnic oligarchy within 
the structure of the state, sharing government positions among them while selling 
other lucrative positions within government departments to clients. This informal 
ethnic power-sharing structure was entrenched in the new state but is viewed with 
disdain by the wider public, which is generally excluded from its material benefi ts. 
The informal elite accommodation was a legacy of alliance-building under the US 
occupation and contrasted with the formal constitutional arrangement post-2004. 
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 The formal constitution was promulgated at a national deliberative conference, 
a  Loya Jurga , held in Afghanistan in late 2003, and explicitly sought to institution-
alise nationally shared foundations for solidarity beyond ethnic loyalty. In the fi rst 
instance, the constitution was grounded in religious solidarity as the key foundation 
for political solidarity. It centralised power in an “Islamic Republic, independent, 
unitary and indivisible state” (A.1) and defi ned a civic Islamic political culture, 
embedded in non-authoritarian models of Islam, allowing for religious freedom for 
other religions as well as across Islamic traditions: Shia, Sunni, Sufi . 
 The constitution expressed a mode of an inclusive political Islam in contrast 
with a doctrinaire political Islam, in non-civic mode, where one interpretation of 
religious culture is asserted above others. The constitution grounds its legal author-
ity in Islam – it is only sovereign insofar as it is compatible with Islam. It was 
declared in the year 1382 on the Islamic calendar and names Afghanistan as an 
Islamic republic, requiring all law to conform to Islamic “tenets and provisions”. 
The constitution asserts a version of Sharia law (religious law) that is compatible 
with human rights norms: provisions for the supreme court state that ordinarily it 
acts in “pursuance of Hanafi  jurisprudence, and, within the limits set by this Consti-
tution” (Article 130). Hanafi  is a School of Sunni law practiced in much of Central 
Asia where law is interpreted by both secular and religious authorities (Warren 
2013). Refl ecting this, the six members of the supreme court are appointed by 
elected politicians (named by the president, endorsed by parliament), not by the 
religious orders. 
 Legal pluralism is accommodated, with the courts required to “apply Shia juris-
prudence in cases involving personal matters of followers of the Shia sect in accord-
ance with the provisions of the law” (Article 131). The framework for education 
exemplifi es the model, in requiring a “unifi ed educational curricula based on the 
tenets of the sacred religion of Islam”, along with “curricula for schools on the basis 
of existing Islamic sects in Afghanistan” (Article 45). Freedom of religion is asserted 
within this framework, with Article 2 stating the “followers of other faiths shall be 
free within the bounds of law in the exercise and performance of their religious 
rituals”: with the “bounds of the law” defi ned by Islam, religious freedom rests on 
respect for Islam. As such, political parties may only be established that do not “con-
travene the Holy religion of Islam” (Article 35). 
 There is support for ethnic diversity, but tribalism and sectarianism are out-
lawed. While centralising power, the 2004 Constitution recognised Afghanistan as 
a multi-ethnic country (Article 4). At the same time, it explicitly forbids tribalism 
and sectarianism, stating the “formation and operation of a party on the basis 
of tribalism, parochialism, language, as well as religious sectarianism shall not be 
permitted” (Article 35). Ministers were not to “use their positions for linguistic, 
sectarian, tribal, religious or partisan purposes” (A80). With the state defi ned as 
impartial, the constitution recognises ethnic identities, at Article 4 stating “[t]he 
nation of Afghanistan shall be comprised of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turk-
man, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui 
and other tribes”. 
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 Article 6 then recognises the equal status of “all ethnic groups and tribes”. This 
is refl ected in language policy which institutionalises Pashto and Dari as fi rst and 
second languages and any local language as the third language (Article 16). The 
national anthem “shall be in Pashto with the mention of ‘God is Great’ as well as the 
names of the major ethnic groups of Afghanistan” (Article 20). This recognition of 
local languages and tribal affi liations was, interestingly, one of the most contentious 
issues at the constitutional  Loya Jirga , precipitating a walk-out by 40 per cent of the 
delegates (Adeney 2008). 
 Despite recognition of ethnic diversity, there is no entrenched requirement 
for regional autonomy. A structure of provincial district and municipal councils is 
established, only with devolution of power as required (Article 137). Since 2004, 
provincial councils have been constituted and have sought increased powers and 
resources, though they remain relatively weak and exist at the behest of the central 
state (Adeney 2008). They may, though, develop to displace centre-peripheral ten-
sions from ethnicised competition for central resources into regionally grounded 
aspirations and priorities. These local versions of the state offer the possibility of 
cultural provincialism, local democracy and hence legitimation, in the exercise of 
devolved local powers within a unitary state. In practice, however, and refl ecting 
the military occupation, effective power has remained centralised in the presidency. 
 Beyond religion and ethno-regional identifi cation, the constitution also vests 
its authority in national political solidarity. Here, the foundation for solidarity is 
the state itself, legitimised as an expression of the Afghan nation. Legitimacy may 
be claimed in terms of a value commitment, vested in human rights norms and 
national citizenship, and in terms of representation as expressed in elected national 
assemblies and the elected presidency. In terms of representation, the 2004 Con-
stitution vests considerable power in the directly elected president, who selects 
two vice-presidents, appoints ministers, defi nes policy and appoints provincial 
governors. It also establishes a directly elected lower house “of the people”. The 
parliamentary electoral system is majoritarian, with more than one candidate per 
constituency, elected under the Single Non-Transferable Vote system. In addition, 
an upper house “of elders” is constituted from provincial and district councils, with 
a third of its membership appointed by the presidency. The lower house holds the 
legislative power; the upper house takes a more advisory role. Judicial authority is 
vested in an independent supreme court, which is responsible for enforcing consti-
tutional protections for the citizenry. The court is to entrench human rights, non-
discrimination and civil and political freedoms, qualifi ed by undefi ned “duties”, 
and by a broader “public interest” (Articles 22; 23; 24). National identifi cation is 
bolstered by a development mandate, with some guarantee of social security. At 
Article 6, the state is committed “to create a prosperous and progressive society 
based on social justice, preservation of human dignity, protection of human rights, 
realisation of democracy, attainment of national unity as well as equality between all 
peoples and tribes and balance development of all areas of the country”. Health and 
education is a special focus, with a commitment to “free preventative healthcare and 
treatment of diseases” (Article 52) and for the provision of “educational institutes 
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free of charge by the state” (Article 43). Beyond this there is some declaratory com-
mitment to help develop industries and agriculture (Article 17). 
 Set against this, some key clauses seem more directed at the interests of the 
occupiers than at the impoverished population. Under Article 10, the constitu-
tion requires the state to “encourage, protect as well as ensure the safety of capital 
investment and private enterprises in accordance with the provisions of the law and 
market economy”. This neoliberal constraint on policy is bolstered by Article 11, 
which imposes a requirement that the central bank be independent and Article 40 
which protects property from confi scation. Under Article 41, foreign ownership of 
immovable property is not permitted, but leasing “for the purpose of capital invest-
ment” is. And perhaps most importantly, security crises can trump the constitution, 
with the president, as head of state, explicitly vested with a specially defi ned power 
to declare a “state of emergency” where “protection of independence and national 
life become impossible through the channels specifi ed in this Constitution” (A143). 
 Overall, the 2004 Constitution clearly seeks to defi ne and entrench cross-
national solidarities, whether Islamic or nationalist, recognising local, tribal and 
ethnic identifi cation within the framework of the state. Ethnicity is subsumed into 
the national structure and outlawed as a basis for political mobilisation. On this 
basis, the country has so far embarked on three electoral cycles, with elections in 
2004, 2009 and 2014. The outcomes of these elections in terms of de-ethnicisation 
are hotly debated. 
 Democracy and ethnic de-alignment? 
 The role of the central state mapped out in the 2004 Constitution is one of manag-
ing and correlating ethnic identifi cations. As noted, in the context of the Taliban 
insurgency, pragmatic alliance-building led to informal power-sharing structures 
for rule. As with power-sharing arrangements more generally, these informal 
arrangements have had the potential to ethnicise the state as an ethnocracy, insti-
tutionalising what may be more fl uid identifi cations (Lijphart 1977). As noted, the 
2004 Constitution is explicitly aimed at overcoming ethnic division and preventing 
ethnocracy, and articulates an amalgam of Islamic and national solidarity to achieve 
this. Arguably, the implementation of the constitution could open up new pos-
sibilities for cross-ethnic bargaining and allow the creation of new forms of non-
ethnicised, national-level political antagonism. 
 A strong narrative of de-ethnicisation, as refl ected in voting patterns, is widely 
claimed. The majoritarian electoral system is said to encourage cross-ethnic alli-
ance-building in the presidential election given that the dominant Pashtun group 
only claims at most 40 per cent of the national electorate. Nonetheless, ethnicisa-
tion in the 2004 presidential election was extensive. This serves as a baseline, directly 
refl ecting the initial ethnicisation of formal inter-party politics. In 2004, the over-
whelming majority of voters cast their vote for a co-ethnic candidate: 95 per cent 
of Pashtuns voted for Karzai, 90 per cent of Uzbeks for Dostum and 80 per cent 
Hazaras for Mohaqiq; there was a similar ethnicisation in the 2005 parliamentary 
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election. Giustozzi argues that the main drivers for this were the absence of ideo-
logical disputation in the country’s fi rst election since the Taliban regime, along 
with weak class formation, low state capacity and the impact of external infl uences 
(2015 ). The relative lack of political antagonism in the context of the Taliban insur-
gency may have been a contributing factor. 
 The 2009 election was seriously corrupted by the incumbent president, with 
about a fi fth of the votes invalidated. The 2014 presidential election was also exten-
sively corrupted, requiring a full recount. Yet, it is also seen as signalling a new 
departure, as Mobasher notes, “the scale of cross-ethnic voting in the Afghan elec-
tion of 2014 was extraordinary” (2016 , 369). In this context, inter-ethnic bargains 
appeared to unravel in a wider context of political contention. Elections have “not 
followed the neat simplistic ethnic logic of the kind often projected as the eter-
nal fact of Afghan social political life” (Sharma 2017, 151). Rather, they have a 
life of their own, shaped by a wide range of contingent, non-ethnicised matters. 
For Sharma, ethnicity is seen as a changing resource, with post-2001 demands for 
ethnic parity positioned as a political manoeuvre. Certainly, ethnicity has become 
more salient in elite bargaining but at the same time, Islam and the idea of the 
nation have strengthened as identifi ers. The result is a potentially complementary 
set of national, ethno-regional and religious solidarities, producing an amalgam, 
a co-national ethno-religious identifi cation allowing a sustainable process of de-
escalation in political violence. 
 Conclusions 
 In 2010, the US Defence Secretary and the US Brigadier General in Afghanistan 
debated their reliance on what they termed “thugocracy” in Afghanistan as a nec-
essary evil in their struggle against Taliban-style “theocracy” (quoted in Shahrani 
2015, 296). One question that arises in the context of the 2014 election and the 
2015 US military withdrawal is whether that US-sponsored “thugocracy” is now 
in transition to “ethnocracy” or “democracy”. The signals are mixed, but there is 
certainly evidence of a changing political landscape. One key factor, as argued here, 
is the relative weakness of ethnic identifi cation in Afghan society, both historically 
and currently. Non-ethnic and localised affi liations appear to have gained greater 
social importance in the context of on-going civil confl ict. In contrast, ethnic iden-
tifi cation is more confi ned to elite-level bargaining, where it serves as a proxy for 
military rivalry. At the same time, the constitution and growing autonomy follow-
ing the US withdrawal appears in some respects to have facilitated cross-ethnic 
bargaining, disrupting bloc formation. As inter-elite rivalry gives way to strate-
gic alliance-building, we can expect stronger cross-ethnic ideological engagement, 
especially on national development concerns relating to gender and poverty. From 
this perspective, Afghan politics may be moving into a post-ethnocratic phase and 
towards the form of Islamic democracy envisaged under the constitution. 
 Afghanistan’s long history of inter-ethnic relations, overlaid with religious and 
national solidarities, and hinging on local-level loyalties and obligations, has not 
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readily embraced ethnicised politics. Despite the ethnicisation of militias and elites, 
and a history riven with social dislocation and confl ict, the country has not, as a 
rule, experienced ethnic confl ict on the scale common in parallel contexts. The long 
period of externally funded warlordism, civil war and then occupation instituted 
a model of inter-ethnic and ethnocratic rule; yet, this appears to have been only 
weakly entrenched in Afghan society. The logic of US occupation, of sustaining a 
military alliance against an increasingly nationalist Taliban insurgency, underpinned 
the continued ethnicisation of politics. As argued here, there is some evidence that 
this model of political rule may be receding with the end of the occupation and 
the return of political independence. This suggests a strong relationship between 
occupation and ethnocracy, potentially relevant to other contexts. 
 Certainly, wider research points to the corrupting effect of military occupation, 
especially in undermining prospects for strengthened identifi cation with national-
level elites (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013). With the end of occupation, there are 
signs of a revival of a national-level political culture. Against this, there are inherent 
dangers of ethnic hegemony in the centralised winner-takes-all model, as refl ected 
in the electoral system and the presidential structure. But there is always a risk 
of ethno-regionalist alienation, as Adeney points out, arguing for much stronger 
guarantees of multi-ethnic power-sharing (2008 ). This approach assumes (and, we 
would argue, imputes) abiding ethnic identifi cation and may have the effect of 
institutionalising inter-ethnic rivalry. The informal elite model of ethnic-military 
accommodation established in 2001 may be now in the process of being superseded 
by new forms of political bargaining and national-level contention. In this context, 
new political blocs may emerge, grounded in the deep structural stratifi cation of 
Afghan society, claiming the capacity to displace the militarised ethnocracy of the 
occupation period. As the Afghan people gain greater control of their political 
destiny, after decades of occupation and militarisation, there appears to be a new 
dynamism. 
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